INTRODUCTION
In many ways, World War Two in the Pacific begins with the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905: the Russo-Japanese War. The level of swagger that results from Japan’s decisive end to that war is passed on to a younger generation of officers, who embrace an unwavering belief in Japanese military superiority. In 1931, that belief is a primary justification for Japan to invade and occupy Manchuria, China. This blatant act of aggression draws immediate condemnation from the Western powers, though none is willing to commit military assistance to China’s defense. The ease with which the Japanese secure such a large area of China (and insert their own puppet government) seems to justify the wisdom of their strategy. It is as though by accomplishing their goals, they prove those goals correct.
As the more militant voices take control of the government, Japan’s Emperor Hirohito still holds sway, with a spiritual and emotional grip on his government and military. But the emperor, by all accounts a meek and mild-mannered man, will not insert himself directly into politics. Though he objects often to the practices of the more aggressive generals, he does little about them. This paves the way for nearly fifteen years of domination by Japan’s military, leaving it free to push forward its own aggressive strategic planning.
Emboldened by its initial successes in China, the military plans a grand strategy that will spread Japanese influence, if not outright control, over most of Asia. It is driven in part by the need for natural resources, including oil, rubber, and metals, most of which Japan does not have within its own borders. But a growing racism also drives these goals, particularly the belief among many Japanese that they are a race superior to those they seek to conquer. These include the Koreans, who have already suffered under Japanese rule for decades; the Mongolians; the Southeast Asian peoples; and, of course, the Chinese. This notion of Japanese racial superiority extends beyond Asia as well; many in the Japanese military assume that the West lacks the courage to stand up to Japan’s aggressiveness. According to Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga, “the idea that ‘all men are brothers’ is simply missing” from the culture.
Over the next few years, the Japanese military continues to expand its conquest of China, and despite energetic condemnation from around the globe, Japanese resolve never wavers. Gradually, the focus of Japanese hostility turns more toward the United States, despite the fact that the Americans have been a primary trading partner, supplying Japan with the very raw materials it needs. According to Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, who authors a strategic report widely accepted by his superiors, “Japan must be willing to fight America to achieve our national objectives.”
Despite the prediction from Colonel Kanji that “three or four divisions and a few river gunboats will be quite enough to handle the Chinese…,” the Chinese army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, begins to resist the Japanese invasion with more tenacity than expected. The result is a strategic slugfest that the Japanese military euphemistically describes as the “Chinese Problem.” Although this is unknown to much of the outside world, the Japanese army commits a series of brutal atrocities against the Chinese, often against civilians. And despite a lack of any real gain in their costly campaign, the Japanese believe that withdrawing from China would be an admission of error, the kind of shame the Japanese find unacceptable. The cost of that campaign increases the need for Japan to pursue other conquests, meeting their need for natural resources.
On September 1, 1939, the attention of the world turns away from Asia as a new crisis rips through Europe, when Hitler’s Germany invades Poland. In the United States, President Roosevelt and the American military leaders embrace the belief that Hitler is a far greater threat than anything the Japanese might be planning. The Western world is shocked as Hitler slices his way through northern Europe with relative ease, including a crushing victory over the French army that takes barely three weeks. Occupying Paris, Hitler spreads his brutality outward in several directions, from Scandinavia to North Africa. His most logical target now is Great Britain, which desperately seeks aid from the United States. As concern grows over Hitler’s successes, there is enormous pressure within the U.S. government to pull its warships away from their primary base in Hawaii in order to add much-needed strength to protect shipping in the Atlantic.
But Roosevelt’s pledge of assistance to Britain is not universally supported by the American people. For years, the movement favoring American isolationism has spread, and many insist that what happens over there should stay over there. Many isolationists view the great oceans to the east and west as impregnable barriers that will protect the United States from any real danger. It is the military chiefs who are quick to point out that oceans can also be highways—that in the modern world of 1940, no place on earth is safe from the submarine or the great warship. However, there is little objection to Roosevelt’s push to remove ships from Hawaii. As they sit at anchor in Pearl Harbor, many, including high-ranking naval officers, believe their presence in the Pacific is simply a waste of time.
In 1940, the Japanese enter into the Tripartite Pact, which is essentially a treaty with Germany and Mussolini’s Italy pledging joint cooperation as the war moves forward. Some in the American government are shocked by this unexpected alliance. The war that has been over there has just become far more complicated, and far more dangerous. The fear is that if the Japanese receive direct military assistance from Germany, they might be inclined to use it. Yet very few of America’s leaders take that threat seriously.
At the end of 1940, the rhetoric from Tokyo becomes increasingly hostile, aimed at both the United States and Britain. If they hear it at all, the vast majority of American military chiefs and their civilian counterparts dismiss such talk with amusement: a tiny mouse roaring at a lion. The racism of the day only adds to the utter dismissal of the Japanese, with posters and cartoons depicting them with enormous buckteeth and inch-thick eyeglasses, incapable of walking in a straight line. Newspapers and Hollywood reinforce the stereotypes, lulling the public into a state of utter complacency.
In Hawaii sits the commander in chief of the U.S. Navy for the entire Pacific basin. His job is to protect American interests, including island bases spread throughout the ocean as well as those in the Philippines. On the island of Oahu, the U.S. Army also maintains a substantial presence, protecting the American naval fleet when it sits at anchor within Pearl Harbor. The two forces, logically, are expected to be mutually supportive and maintain a steady flow of communication with their chiefs in Washington. But these are regarded as frustrating, boring assignments. There simply is no threat.
“Should Japan go to war, one would have to resign oneself to it as unavoidable and throw oneself wholeheartedly into the fight.”
—ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO, JANUARY 1941
“The Japanese are not going to risk a fight with a first-class nation. They are unprepared to do so, and no one knows that better than they do.”
—CONGRESSMAN CHARLES FADDIS (PENNSYLVANIA), FEBRUARY 1941